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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDrrox's NorE.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

TITLE-LIENS--OPTIONS-No. 12279Thomas E. Anderson vs. E. H. Pihistrom Investment Company, et al.-DecidedMay 19, 1930.
Facts.-This is a suit to quiet title to property, alleging
title and possession. The defendant, the Title Investment
Company, failed to answer. The defendant, E. H. Pihlstrom
Investment Company, cross-complained, claiming a lien for
$2500 which was evidenced by a certain recorded document.
The plaintiff contends that this document is no more than an
unexecuted option.
On July 2, 1924, the defendant obtained in a trade with
one Mrs. Rose A. Agnew, two notes, one for $1000, and the
other for $2491.23 secured by a deed of trust to property located in Jefferson County. Upon default, this property was
foreclosed and bid in by the defendant for the amount of the
smaller note. The defendant received a public trustee's deed
on May 15, 1926.
On June 26, 1925 Mrs. Agnew transferred the title to the
property in question (a residence in Denver) to the Defendant, The Temple Investment Company, of which she was
the organizer and the President.
On September 11, 1925, the recorded contract, which it is
now contended constitutes a lien, was executed. On January
5, 1926, The Temple Company transferred, by Quit Claim
Deed, the property now in question to the Plaintiff. This
deed was recorded on March 2, 1926 on which date Mrs.
Agnew died.
The terms of the contract in question, made between the
Pihlstrom Company and the Temple Investments Company,
provided if the Temple Company would pay the notes of
$1000 and $2491.23, the taxes, and the foreclosure costs by
executing a Deed of Trust to the Denver property (now in
question) within ten days after the Pihlstrom Company reSUITS

TO

QUIET

DICTA

ceived a Trustee's Deed to the Jefferson County property, that
then the Temple Company was to have the right to purchase
the Jefferson County property, and that this Deed of Trust
before mentioned was to constitute full consideration for the
transfer of the Jefferson County property to the Temple Company. It was further provided that time was the essence of
the contract. The rights of the Temple Company under this
contract were never exercised.
The lower court held that Plaintiff had title subject to
the lien claimed by the Defendant. Plaintiff alleged error.
Held.-"Undoubtedly this instrument is nothing more
than a mere conditional option" the privileges of which have
not been exercised. Accordingly, it can in no way be construed as a lien.
Reversed and Remanded.
OF-No. 12268-Martha A.
Brown and Hazel Brown Flanagan vs. The Estate of John
J. Roche, Deceased.-DecidedMay 19, 1930.
Facts.-The Plaintiffs, as sole heirs of D. W. Brown,
claimed 1212 shares of stock in the Rocky Mountain Fuel
Company from the estate of John J. Roche. The transaction
from which the claim arose contained the following writing,
"Apr. 4th 1922-In settlement made this date between D. W.
Brown and John J. Roche on Pfd and Common Stock R M F
shares of Pfd and Common Stock
Co, there are
Said Co-Still due D. W. Brown-John J. Roche". Between
the words "are" and "shares", there appeared a figure which
could be taken as 1212 or as 122. The County Court allowed
the claim for 1212 shares and an appeal was taken to the district court, where, from evidence not presented in the county
court, an award was made for 122 shares. The court found
that the last "1" in the figure "1212" was intended as a fractional line making the amount 122 shares. Plaintiffs allege
error.
Held.-The findings of fact of the district court on the
trial, without a jury, was well justified by the evidence, and
they will not be disturbed by the higher court.
CONTRACTS-INTERPRETATION

DICTA
oF-No. 12271Gus Stroup and J. L. Shepard, co-partners, doing business
under the firm name and style of Stroup and Shepard, and
Gus Stroup vs. P. C. Pearce-DecidedMay 19, 1930.
Facts.-The Plaintiff, Pearce sued to recover $635.60
alleged to be owing to him for hauling ties. The terms of the
written contract were substantially as follows.
In the first paragraph of the contract, the Plaintiff agreed
to haul ties from Dutton Creek Landing, Wyoming, to Rock
River, Wyoming, the job to be completed by a stipulated time.
The second paragraph of the contract provided that Stroup
was to pay 17c per tie for all ties hauled from Dutton Creek
Landing, "and the sum of 2c for each tie per mile or fraction
thereof hauled from above Dutton Creek Landing" plus the
17c for hauling from Dutton Creek Landing to Rock River.
The third paragraph provided that the Plaintiff should execute a bond to assure his performance.
The bond which was executed assured performance by
the Plaintiff in hauling from Dutton Creek Landing. The
question was whether or not the Plaintiff had obligated himself to haul ties from above Dutton Creek Landing.
The trial court held that the Plaintiff, by the terms of the
contract, had received the right to haul from above Dutton
Creek Landing for the additional compensation, but that he
had not obligated himself to do so. Judgment was given for
the Plaintiff.
Held.-If the contract was ambiguous, the parties, by
the execution of the bond, placed their own construction upon
it.
Judgment Affirmed.
CONTRACTS-SEVERABLE-CONSTRUCTION

PARTNERSHIP -

RETIRING PARTNER -

LIABILITY OF

-

No.

12554-Robert S. Faricy vs. J. S. Brown Mercantile Company, a Corporation-DecidedMay 12, 1930.
Facts.-Faricy and one M. C. Davis were engaged in a
partnership. The partnership was dissolved and Davis retained the assets of the firm and agreed to pay the existing
liabilities. Faricy notified the plaintiff company of the terms
of the agreement and told them to proceed to collect from
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Davis what was due them. Davis, it was alleged, was then
solvent and able to take care of his obligations. Subsequently,
Davis became insolvent. The Brown Company, not having
been paid instituted this action. The defendant contended
that the planitiff had not pursued its action against Davis diligently and that therefore this action should be barred. Judgment was had for the plaintiff in the trial court.
Held.-"Where a person agrees to assume the existing
obligations of a dissolved partnership, the partners whose obligations have been assumed shall be discharged from any liability to any creditor of the partnership who, knowing of the
agreement consents to a material alteration in the nature or
time of payment of such obligations." Here, the creditor did
not consent nor can his refusal to sue Davis be construed as
consent to any alteration of the obligation.
Judgment Affirmed.
INJUNCTION-NAMES-RIGHT TO USE OF-No. 12242-L. I.
DaPronvs. J. T. Russell, doing business as DaPronSchool
of Dancing-Decided May 12, 1930.
Facts.-J.T. Russell brought this action to restrain the
defendant "from using the name DaPron in any manner pertaining to a school of ballet and ball room dancing." The
plaintiff came into ownership of a dancing school originally
owned and operated by the defendant. Defendant, a considerable time after the plaintiff owned the school, started another
school known as "The DaPron School for Ballet and Ball
Room Dancing." The plaintiff sought an injunction and the
defendant counter claimed for an injunction, each seeking to
enjoin the other from using the name DaPron in connection
with a ball room. The trial court dismissed the counter claim
and granted plaintiff an injunction. Defendant alleged error.
Held.-A man has a right to use his own name in conducting his business so long as he is not guilty of "fraud,
deceit, or other unfair or dishonest practice, or that he violated
some contractual obligation respecting the use" thereof.
Judgment reversed with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
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1215The South Boulder Canon Ditch Company, a Corporation
vs. The Davidson Ditch and Reservoir Company, a Corporation, and The New South Boulder and Rock Creek
Company, a Corporation.-DecidedMay 12, 1930.
Facts.-The Plaintiffs were junior and the Defendants
senior appropriators to water rights. Defendants, by virtue of
a decree of 1882, held an adjudicated right to a total of 218.37
cubic'feet per second. The Plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from using more than 66 feet of the defendant's decreed water on the grounds that the remainder had been
abandoned. The evidence showed that for a period of forty
years subsequent to the adjudication, the defendant used but
66 feet of the water. The lower court granted the injunction.
Defendant alleged error.
Held.-"While the record in this case undoubtedly discloses evidence of intention to abandon, other than that imputed by non use over a long period of years, still we have no
hesitancy in ruling that evidence of non-use of water for a
period of forty years in itself is sufficient to prove a prima
facie case of abandonment."
Judgment Affirmed.
WATER RIGHTS-PRIORITIES-ABANDONMENT-NO.

WATER RIGHTS - PERCOLATING WATERS - EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY OF-NO. 12276-The Pure Springs Supply Com-

pany, a Colorado Corporation vs. The Town of Olney
Springs, Colorado, et al.-Decided May 12, 1930.
Facts.-The Plaintiff Corporation sought to enjoin the
Defendant Municipality from using wells constructed by the
Defendant to supply its citizens, on the grounds that the Defendant's use caused a diminution of the Plaintiff's supply.
Plaintiff was prior in time and Defendant's wells were on
adjoining tract of land to that on which were the wells belonging to the Plaintiff. The trial court found for the defendant
stating that the Defendant's use did not interfere with the
Plaintiff's supply.
Held.-The Supreme Court will not disturb the findings
of fact of the trial court unless it appears that such findings
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are not sustained by the evidence.
Judgment Affirmed.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW-DISBARMENT-No. 12520-The People

of the State of Colorado ex rel The Colorado Bar Association Petitioner vs. Samuel Winograd-Decided May 5,
1930.
Facts.-On complaint by the Grievance Committee of the
Colorado Bar Association acting pursuant to rules of the
Supreme Court five specific charges were recorded against the
respondent. No evidence was offered as to one of the charges,
and the evidence as to another was brief and unsatisfactory.
The remaining three are namely:
1. The Flood-Konklin charge is to the effect that respondent failed to make settlement for monies collected by
him for his client until he was forced to do so.
2. One Price employed the respondent to file a mechanics lien, which respondent failed to do, so that his client was
deprived of his lien and compelled to employ another attorney.
3. Gonzales and Doninques employed the respondent to
represent them on a grand larceny charge. Respondent agreed
that if the defendant were given a penitentiary sentence he
would refund his fee. Defendant's clients were sentenced to
the penitentiary and respondent gave his note for the returnable fee. This note has not been paid.
Respondent Indefinitely Suspended.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW-DISBARMENT-No. 12592-The People

of the State of Colorado upon the Relation of the Attorney
General vs. John G. Powell-Decided May 5, 1930.
Facts.-Respondent,according to the charges against him
represented to Phillip Van Cise in the Ver Stratton case that
for proper consideration he could furnish the names of certain
members of the jury panel who would vote for acquittal. Respondent in his answer refused to admit the charges but would
not defend himself against them.
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Held.-"By failure to deny the same the respondent in
legal effect admits the charges to be true."
Respondent disbarred.
PROPER PARTIES - SALES--NO. 12295-The
Denver Milk Bottle, Case & Canned Exchange, Inc. vs. J.
A. McKinzie-Decided May 5, 1930.
Facts.-The plaintiff corporation composed of 75 members was organized to collect the bottles of its members and
re-distribute them to their proper owners. Compiled Laws
21 provides that the owners of milk bottles may register their
mark with the Secretary of State and stamp that mark upon
the bottles owned by them. All of plaintiff's members had
complied with the statute. Defendant who is not associated
with the Exchange admits possession of 110 bottles bearing
the names of 16 members of the Association. Defendant contended first that the plaintiff was not the party to bring the
action, but that it should have been brought by the members
whose bottles he held. Second, that injunction should not lie,
the plaintiff having adequate remedy at law, and third that
the defendant was the owner of the bottles in question. The
trial court held for the defendant and the plaintiff alleged
error.
Held.-l. The Exchange, in the furtherance of its
obvious corporate purpose can protect its various members.
Hence, if injunction is the proper action the plaintiff is the
proper party.
2. It having been shown that the cost of suit was clearly
more than the value of a recovery in an action to retrieve the
bottles or to recover their value, and in so far as such remedies
offer no protection against future offences "the preventive
remedy is injurction, the only remedy that is adequate."
3. As milk bottles are never sold but are merely loaned,
any deposit placed upon them by a consumer or dealer being
merely to insure their return, the defendant could not have
purchased them as he contended in so far as no title could pass
to him.
Reversed and Remanded.
INJUNCTION -
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12274
-M. C. Harringtonand R. W. Hershey as the Managerof
Safety and Excise ex officio Sheriff in the City and County
of Denver vs. Enoch Anderson.-Decided May 5, 1930.
Facts.-This was an action by Anderson to quiet title to
lands against which Harrington contended he held a lien. On
March 5, 1924, one Hahnwold executed a trust deed to the
Public Trustee to secure a loan made by the Western Finance
and Development Company. Subsequently because of default, foreclosure was had by the Public Trustee at which the
Star Investment Company became the purchasers. The Public Trustee issued a certificate of purchase on August 25th,
1925. On May 9th the State Bank Commissioner recovered
judgment against Hahnwold. On September 5th the judgment was assigned to the defendant. On February 18, 1926,
the Star Company recovered judgment in the District Court
against Hahnwold. There was no redemption from the
Trustee's sale during the six month period. On February 26th
the Star Company as a judgment creditor redeemed from the
sale. The Star Company got an execution on its judgment
and procured a sale by the sheriff. The sheriff's deed to the
Star Company was dated March 29th, 1926. Plaintiff acquired the rights of the Star Company. Plaintiff also paid
off a prior mortgage on the property and secured a release
thereof. Defendant procured an execution on his judgment,
and on September 21st a notice of levy on the land in question
was filed. Shortly before the time set for the sheriff's sale on
defendant's levy, plaintiff brought this action to quiet title.
The trial court held for the plaintiff.
Held.-Session Laws 23 Chapter 185 gives judgment
creditors of a mortgagor a right after the expiration of six
months, and before nine months to redeem lands which were
not redeemed by the mortgagor.
Plaintiff's grantor complied with the statute and defendant's grantor did not.
Judgment Affirmed.
QUIET TITLE-LIENS-PUBLIC TRUSTEE SALES-No.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-EASEMENT-LACK OF MEMORY
-INSTRUCTIONS--No.
12216-The Mountain States Tele-
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phone and Telegraph Company, a corporation vs. Charles
J. Sanger-DecidedMay 5, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff while riding a horse was injured by
colliding with the defendant's telephone lines, which crossed
his the plaintiff's land. Defendant had an easement over the
land to maintain their lines secured from Plaintiff's grantor.
From a judgment for the plaintiff for $9000 defendant brings
error.
Held.-l. Defendant had only such an easement as was
necessary for their use without any more than the peril necessarily involved in such use. Phone lines should not menace
travel.
2. An instruction that it was the defendant's duty to
maintain its lines so as not to interfere with the plaintiff's use
is objectionable, because it would deny the defendant's right
to the proper use of their easement if that use were inconsistent
with the plaintiff's use of his land.
3. An instruction stating the measure of damages and
enumerating "bodily pain", "mental suffering", "actual damages", "impairment of health" and "permanent injury" was
objected to as misleading in so far as all of these are included
in "actual damages", the court directs that the instruction be
remedied so as to avoid the possibility of being misleading.
4. Justifiable distraction and forgetfulness relieves a
party of contributory negligence. The question as to what
constitutes justifiable distraction is one for the jury.
5. A man can introduce evidence of his earning capacity,
even though he be a farmer with capital invested, not for the
purpose of offering a measure of damages but to aid the jury
in estimating a fair compensation for being prevented by the
complained of injury from engaging in his work.
Reversed and Remanded.
DOGS-RABIES-NEGLIGENCE

IN KEEPING DOGS-INSTRUC-

TIONS-No. 12292-John Carlberg vs. Joe Willmott-Decided May 5, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff kept a herd of milch cows one of which
was bitten by defendant's dog. The injured cow died from
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rabies, and plaintiff had his entire herd vaccinated. The plaintiff's evidence showed the reasonable value of the cow to be
$150 and the cost of vaccinating $100. Prior to this event the
town counsel had warned all owners of dogs to keep them
securely restrained, it having been learned that rabies was
prevalent in the community. Defendant admitted having been
warned but alleged that he had complied with the warning,
and that at the time the plaintiff's cow was injured the defendant's dog had been set free by another person against the defendant's wishes and without his knowledge. The case was
tried upon the theory of negligence exclusively, and not with
reference to the common law or statutory liability. Judgment
was had in the Justice of the Peace Court for $250, and defendant appealed to the County Court where verdict was
entered for $150. To review this judgment defendant brought
error.
Held.-I. When the owner of a dog knows of the presence of rabies in the community "he becomes liable for all
damages by reason of injuries inflicted by the dog when rabid."
2. Objections to instructions must be made in compliance with the rule 7 of the rules of the Supreme Court or it
will not be considered.
Judgment Affirmed.
DEED OF TRUST -

FORECLOSURE -

BROKERS--AGENCY-NO.

12,312-Alma Hahn vs. Bert L. Alexander, The Interstate
Securities Company, The Farmers State Bank of Brush,
Colorado, et al-DecidedApril 28, 1930.
Facts.-Alexander made a note dated January 2, 1917,
due January 2, 1924, secured by deed of trust on land in Washington County, Colorado. The note and interest coupons
attached to it were all made payable to The Interstate Securities Company in Minneapolis. March 8, 1917 the note was
assigned to John Hahn, and thereafter to Margaret Hahn, the
plaintiff in this case, who alleged that certain interest coupons
and the principal had not been paid, and prayed for judgment
against the makers and for a foreclosure of the deed of trust.
The evidence shows that the principal and interest were paid
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to The Interstate Securities Company but were not remitted
by it to Hahn. In 1924 the company went into the hands of a
receiver. The evidence showed that Hahn had owned
another loan which he had purchased from The Interstate
Securities Company, and had expressly authorized it to represent him in its collection. The lower court found that The
Interstate Securities Company was the agent of Hahn in this
case and not the agent of Alexander. Judgment was entered
for the defendant and foreclosure was denied.
Held.-The lower court was right and the various cases
cited by the plaintiff in support of her case were based upon
facts unlike those in the present case.
Judgment Affirmed.
IRRIGATING

WATER-PRIORITIES--ADJ UDICATION-JURISDIC-

TION-No. 12,582-Fred W. Hazard, et al vs. The Joseph
W. Bowles Reservoir Company, a corporation-Decided
April 29, 1930.
Facts.-In the general adjudication proceeding in the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in Douglas
County plaintiff company was awarded a reservoir priority in
Patrick Lake. In the same proceeding the senior priority in
the same lake was awarded to Hazard but the decree thereafter was changed, making the corporation's priority senior to
that of Hazard. Thereafter the corporation brought suit for
an injunction to restrain Hazard from taking any of the water
from the Patrick reservoir which is contained in it from the
bottom of the present outlet of Bowles reservoir. The District
Court for the First Judicial District in Arapahoe County
issued an injunction restraining Hazard from using any of
the water from the reservoir.
Held.-The Arapahoe County District Court had no
jurisdiction to decide this question because the District Court
of Douglas County first acquired jurisdiction to adjudicate
the relative priorities of right to use water from the reservoir.
Thereafter no other District Court had any jurisdiction to
hear an action attempting to modify in any way the decree
entered by the District Court of Douglas County.
Judgment Reversed and Remanded with Instructions.
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CRIMINAL LAw-MURDER-EVIDENCE-NO. 12,493-Amelio

Herreravs. The People of the State of Colorado-Decided
April 28, 1930.
Facts.-Herrerawas convicted of murder in the first
degree for killing his wife. The evidence showed that he had
pulled her into a dark and narrow passage-way. Shortly thereafter there was the report of a gun shot, the scream of a woman
and three more gun shots. A man fled from the entry-way but
was not caught. Thereafter Herrera registered at a rooming
house under an assumed name. The next morning he was
arrested. His first story was that his wife had committed
suicide. This was followed by a statement that he had shot
her. His statement was again changed to a declaration that
the gun had been accidentally discharged while he and the
deceased were struggling for its possession.
Held.-Credibility of the witnesses was for the jury.
There was sufficient evidence to warrant the jury in finding
that Herrera was guilty. The verdict, therefore, will not be
disturbed.
Judgment Affirmed.
12,222-J. L.
Lengel vs. The CommercialBank of Las Animas, Colorado,
a Corporation-DecidedApril 28, 1930.
Facts.-In 1926 the State Bank Commissioner notified
the plaintiff below, The Commercial Bank of Las Animas,
that its capital stock was impaired, and ordered it to make an
assessment upon its capital stock of $100.00 per share. The
defendant Lengel, a stockholder, was notified in due course,
but refused to pay the assessment, whereupon the bank
brought its action and obtained a judgment for the assessment
and costs. Lengel defended on the ground that he had been
defrauded at the time the stock was sold to him by various
individuals who at the time of the sale were also officers of
the bank.
Held.-The fact that individual owners of corporate
stock had misrepresented the value of the stock or the condition of the bank is no defense to an action brought to secure
BANK

STOCK-ASSESSMENT-FRAUD--No.
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payment of an assessment made to restore the impaired capital,
and there is no estoppel against the bank to claim the assessment.
Judgment Affirmed.
PERSONAL INJURY-CITY ORDINANCE-CONSTRUCTION-NO.

12212-Kathryn Hicks, an infant, by Ella S. Hicks, her
next friend vs. George W. Cramer, et al-Decided April
28, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff,a minor, was riding in the rear seat of
an automobile driven by her father. Defendant's car approached from their left colliding with plaintiff's father's car
and plaintiff was injured. The Pueblo city ordinance provides,
first, that the vehicle on the right shall have the right of way,
and, second, that the one nearest the center of the intersection
shall have the right of way. The lower court instructed the
jury that if defendant's car had entered the intersection before
plaintiff's father's car, then defendant had the right of way,
but if plaintiff's father's car had entered the intersection first,
then it had the right of way. There was a verdict for the
defendant.
Held.-The lower court attempted to harmonize two inconsistent ordinances. The effect should have been given only
to the one giving the right of way to the vehicle approaching
from the right.
Reversed and Remanded.
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